Wednesday, January 5, 2022

Divine Names IV - Short Commentary

This section requires knowledge of heavy metaphysical ideas. They are:

  • Procession and Reversion 
  • The Good of Plato 
  • Neoplatonic ideas of soul, life, and motion 
What follows is an outline without spelling those ideas out. They will be in separate posts to come later. 


Section One 

Here, Dionysius is going to investigate the divine name of Good. Among other things, he will discuss the names of light, beautiful, love, and provide an account of evil. In the opening lines of chapter four, Dionysius states, “This essential Good, by the very fact of its existence, extends goodness into all things.” What could this mean? Well, we need to understand what the Good is, and only then can we understand why its existence extends goodness into all beings. My intuition is that since goodness is convertible with being, and because the Good gives being to all beings, it also gives them goodness. 


The analogy with the sun raises more questions than it answers. There is no act of will on the part of the Good. It is just like the sun’s rays and its very existence illuminates things with goodness. This is a very important metaphor that Dionysius uses throughout the rest of the chapter. 


Dionysius states that things are made what they are by their longing for the good. “Their longing for the good makes them what they are and confers upon them their well-being. I vaguely know what this means, but it will simply take more study to comprehend the depth of this. As of now here is my interpretation: My longing for the Good is my inclination towards my fullest actuality, and this perfects me, thus perfecting my well-being. For example, as I long for the Good, my intellect longs for truth, my heart longs for more developed virtues, and my appetite longs for beauty. These things, being participations in the good, thus draw me closer to him the more I draw near to them. 


Section Two

Dionysius opens this section by saying that because of what was discussed in section one, all things have their own orders, unities, and relationships, i.e., natures. But how is this? How is it that the Good gives them their natures? By granting them existence? He says that from the cause and source of goodness, all things exemplify the Good and are the “angelic messengers of the divine source.” As to what this means or how this is the case, it requires knowledge of procession and reversion. 


The hierarchy of beings participates in the procession towards the Good. The animals, or souls strive to be like the higher levels. What does this mean? Does it seem to mean that the humans can strive towards the angles, and that we should do that to attain perfection? I think that striving into questions about angels right now raises way too many problems than it solves and is a mistake. I don’t think we can talk of angels without first talking about sensible realities, and that is difficult as of now. 


Dionysius, in the last paragraph of this section, points out that everything has soul and life because of the good. I suppose that he is referring to the Neoplatonic conception of ‘soul’ which I haven’t the faintest idea as to what it specifically is. I am not sure if there is a difference as to ‘soul’ and the principle of life, or life, as Dionysius seems to say. 



Section Three

In the short section three, Dionysius, in characteristic style, hides innumerable insights into Being. First, he gives a short Halperian argument. “Given that Good transcends everything, as indeed it does, its nature, unconfined by form, is the creator of all form.” Dionysius is starting with the premise the the Good transcends all, meaning that it is above, and radically distinct from all things. His second premise is that the Good’s nature is unconfined by form, which follows from premise one. This seems to be an implicit argument: The Good transcends all, form is included within the all, therefore the Good transcends form. From this it follows that the Good is the creator of all form, which seems to assume that the Good, as transcendent, is creator. 


He then asserts that in the Good is not a being, not a life, not a mind, but the superabundance of all of those. This follows from the previously established transcendence of the Good. The Good, by being transcendent, gives rise to individual life, individual minds, and individual beings.   


Then, he refers to the Good as that which gives form to the formless. This is the summarization of sections I and II. In this short line is contained much of Platonic philosophy. By giving form to the formless, the Good confers intelligibility upon things. In conferring intelligibility, by virtue of the convertibility of the transcendentals, the Good confers being, truth, and goodness upon things.   


Finally, he claims that perhaps non-being longs for the Good. This is because non-being is the repelling of being, and the Good itself also is the denial of all beings. There is thus a similarity between non-being and the Good, but I am not sure if that is enough to claim that non-being longs for the Good. 


Section Four

The first two paragraphs here go on about the sun analogy and seem to praise the created order. It is reminiscent of Anselm’s Proslogion. I turn my focus to 697D where Dionysius makes a stunning statement. He says, “It [The Good] sends its shining beams all around the visible world, and if anything fails to receive them the fault lies not in the weakness or defect of the spreading light, but in the inability of whatever is unable to have a share in the light.” I find this fascinating. Is this saying that it is the fault of the person that they cannot receive the light of the Good? If so, then this utterly eviscerates the ‘Divine Hiddenness’ argument of modern analytics philosophy of religion.


He goes on to say that the Good returns all things to itself and gathers together whatever may be scattered, as the Good is both the source and unifying principle of things. In 700 until just before 701 there is a long discussion of procession and reversion. Knowledge of this Proclinian idea is required for understanding this section. I also wonder what the difference is between Thomas’s account of procession and reversion and Dionysius’s?    


Section Five 

Dionysius turns from the discussion of the divine name good to the divine name Light. Clearly, this has references to bk. VI of the Republic, where the Good is portrayed as the sun which illuminates all of reality through the forms. In this same way, Light illuminates our minds and removes the fog of ignorance. That is, the Light, or the Sun in Rep. illuminates our mind by giving rise to the forms which allow us to even speak of reality and see it at all. Without the Light creating the forms, there would be only confusion and nihilism. In this same way, the Light, by allowing access to the forms, eliminates nihilism. 


I am not sure what the discussion of love means - why the Light gives more and more of itself because the beings loved much. Perhaps this means that as the beings participate in this Light and Good, the Good reveals more and more of itself. 


Section Six

He states that the Good, “which is above all light” is given the names of the light of the mind, overflowing radiance, and so forth. 


The Neoplatonic triad of remaining, proceeding, and reverting is doing the heavy lifting in this section. 


The Good, or the Light is a unifying principle as well. It unifies knowledge.


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