Why All Effects Must Remain in, Proceed From, and Revert to Their Causes (Proclus P.35)

Proposition Thirty-Five: Every Effect Both Remains in its Cause, and Proceeds From it, and Reverts Upon It

Proclus attempts to establish this key Neoplatonic doctrine by eliminating all other options. There are six. All six start with assumed premises and derive absurdities. First let us consider what occurs if something only remains. As Proclus says, “For if it were simply to remain, it will in no way differ from its cause, being without distinction from it; for distinction arises simultaneously with procession.” Informally, the argument is that when we assume only that effects remain in their causes, we destroy any difference between the two. This is insane. I construct his argument as such: 

AP: Effects only remain in their cause. 

1). Distinction between cause and effect arises only with procession. 

2). In remaining, there is no procession. 

C: With this AP, there will be no distinction between cause and effect, which is absurd. 

Next, let us assume that effects only proceed from their cause. Proclus says, “And if it should proceed only, it will be devoid of conjunction or sympathy with its cause, since it will have no means of communication with it.” I think that the argument here is similar to the ones found in Scholastic thinkers. Assuming that an effect only proceeds, and has no similarity with its cause, will make the effect unintelligible. In the context of Proclus’s elements,  Proclus doesn’t give us much to go on here so my reconstruction is: 

AP: Effects only proceed from their cause. 

1). Effects have no similarities with their causes. 

2). This is a violation of the principle of proportionate causality and Proposition 7.

C: This is absurd, and causes must at least have some sort of remaining in their cause. 

Thirdly, let’s assume that effects only revert to their causes. Proclus states, “And if it should revert only, how can that which does not derive its being from its cause revert in its being upon a principle that is alien to it?” I take this to be saying that it simply makes no sense to have an effect revert upon its cause because without remaining and proceeding, there wouldn’t be a cause at all. 

AP: Effects only revert upon their cause. 

1). Without remaining or proceeding, there would be no cause in the first place. 

2). To revert upon a cause requires a cause. 

3). So there a requirement for a cause and not for one. 

C: This is a logical contradiction. 

Next, Proclus combines all of these and eliminates three more options. He starts with an effect remaining and proceeding, but not reverting. He says, “And if it should remain and proceed, but does not revert, how does it come about that each thing has a natural desire in the direction of its well-being and the Good, and an upward striving towards its generative cause?” This is where things start to get more complex and it is necessary to understand the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic conception of the Good, and why things strive toward it. That will be covered elsewhere, so just assume that it is the case. Proclus is saying that if things simply remain in, and proceed from their cause, then it does not make sense as to why they strive for the good. 

AP: Things remain in and proceed from their cause. 

1). All things strive for the Good and toward their generative cause. 

2). This tendency is not a remaining or a proceeding. 

C: We must say that all things also revert, and not just remain and proceed. 

Next, he tackles the assumption that things only proceed and revert, but do not remain. Proclus says, “And if it should proceed and revert, but not remain, how does it come about that after being parted from its cause it strives to be conjoined with it, although before being separated there was no conjunction? For if it was conjoined with the cause, it certainly remained in it.” Not only do we encounter the original difficulties here, but they are compounded. He seems to be saying that there is a procession, and a striving toward the cause, but nothing at all in common between them. But this can’t be the case, for when the effect is reverting, it is striving for the aspect of the cause that remains in it.  

AP: Things only proceed and revert to their cause.

1). Without remaining in their cause, things would not have anything to strive toward. 

2). Yet, they do strive toward their cause. 

C: They must then remain in them and the AP must be rejected.   

Finally, Proclus assumes that things remain and revert. He says, “Finally, if it should remain and revert, but not proceed, how can something revert that has not undergone distinction, since all reversion, after all, resembles resolution into that source from which it has been divided according to being?” The idea here, I think, is simple. If a thing is said to remain and revert to its cause, it must be different than its cause. Yet without procession this is impossible, so the assumption is absurd. 

AP: Things only remain and revert to their cause. 

1). In reverting to their cause, they must be distinct from their cause. 

2). A distinction requires procession.

3). There is no procession here. 

4). There can be no distinction and thus no reversion. 

C: This is a contradiction which is absurd. 

The only option left is to conclude that all effects must remain in, proceed from, and revert to their causes. With this, Proclus establishes the common-sense conclusion through the process of elimination.

Divine Names IV - Short Commentary

This section requires knowledge of heavy metaphysical ideas. They are:

• Procession and Reversion 
• The Good of Plato 
• Neoplatonic ideas of soul, life, and motion 

What follows is an outline without spelling those ideas out. They will be in separate posts to come later. 

Section One 

Here, Dionysius is going to investigate the divine name of Good. Among other things, he will discuss the names of light, beautiful, love, and provide an account of evil. In the opening lines of chapter four, Dionysius states, “This essential Good, by the very fact of its existence, extends goodness into all things.” What could this mean? Well, we need to understand what the Good is, and only then can we understand why its existence extends goodness into all beings. My intuition is that since goodness is convertible with being, and because the Good gives being to all beings, it also gives them goodness. 

The analogy with the sun raises more questions than it answers. There is no act of will on the part of the Good. It is just like the sun’s rays and its very existence illuminates things with goodness. This is a very important metaphor that Dionysius uses throughout the rest of the chapter. 

Dionysius states that things are made what they are by their longing for the good. “Their longing for the good makes them what they are and confers upon them their well-being. I vaguely know what this means, but it will simply take more study to comprehend the depth of this. As of now here is my interpretation: My longing for the Good is my inclination towards my fullest actuality, and this perfects me, thus perfecting my well-being. For example, as I long for the Good, my intellect longs for truth, my heart longs for more developed virtues, and my appetite longs for beauty. These things, being participations in the good, thus draw me closer to him the more I draw near to them. 

Section Two

Dionysius opens this section by saying that because of what was discussed in section one, all things have their own orders, unities, and relationships, i.e., natures. But how is this? How is it that the Good gives them their natures? By granting them existence? He says that from the cause and source of goodness, all things exemplify the Good and are the “angelic messengers of the divine source.” As to what this means or how this is the case, it requires knowledge of procession and reversion. 

The hierarchy of beings participates in the procession towards the Good. The animals, or souls strive to be like the higher levels. What does this mean? Does it seem to mean that the humans can strive towards the angles, and that we should do that to attain perfection? I think that striving into questions about angels right now raises way too many problems than it solves and is a mistake. I don’t think we can talk of angels without first talking about sensible realities, and that is difficult as of now. 

Dionysius, in the last paragraph of this section, points out that everything has soul and life because of the good. I suppose that he is referring to the Neoplatonic conception of ‘soul’ which I haven’t the faintest idea as to what it specifically is. I am not sure if there is a difference as to ‘soul’ and the principle of life, or life, as Dionysius seems to say. 

Section Three

In the short section three, Dionysius, in characteristic style, hides innumerable insights into Being. First, he gives a short Halperian argument. “Given that Good transcends everything, as indeed it does, its nature, unconfined by form, is the creator of all form.” Dionysius is starting with the premise the the Good transcends all, meaning that it is above, and radically distinct from all things. His second premise is that the Good’s nature is unconfined by form, which follows from premise one. This seems to be an implicit argument: The Good transcends all, form is included within the all, therefore the Good transcends form. From this it follows that the Good is the creator of all form, which seems to assume that the Good, as transcendent, is creator. 

He then asserts that in the Good is not a being, not a life, not a mind, but the superabundance of all of those. This follows from the previously established transcendence of the Good. The Good, by being transcendent, gives rise to individual life, individual minds, and individual beings.   

Then, he refers to the Good as that which gives form to the formless. This is the summarization of sections I and II. In this short line is contained much of Platonic philosophy. By giving form to the formless, the Good confers intelligibility upon things. In conferring intelligibility, by virtue of the convertibility of the transcendentals, the Good confers being, truth, and goodness upon things.   

Finally, he claims that perhaps non-being longs for the Good. This is because non-being is the repelling of being, and the Good itself also is the denial of all beings. There is thus a similarity between non-being and the Good, but I am not sure if that is enough to claim that non-being longs for the Good. 

Section Four

The first two paragraphs here go on about the sun analogy and seem to praise the created order. It is reminiscent of Anselm’s Proslogion. I turn my focus to 697D where Dionysius makes a stunning statement. He says, “It [The Good] sends its shining beams all around the visible world, and if anything fails to receive them the fault lies not in the weakness or defect of the spreading light, but in the inability of whatever is unable to have a share in the light.” I find this fascinating. Is this saying that it is the fault of the person that they cannot receive the light of the Good? If so, then this utterly eviscerates the ‘Divine Hiddenness’ argument of modern analytics philosophy of religion.

He goes on to say that the Good returns all things to itself and gathers together whatever may be scattered, as the Good is both the source and unifying principle of things. In 700 until just before 701 there is a long discussion of procession and reversion. Knowledge of this Proclinian idea is required for understanding this section. I also wonder what the difference is between Thomas’s account of procession and reversion and Dionysius’s?    

Section Five 

Dionysius turns from the discussion of the divine name good to the divine name Light. Clearly, this has references to bk. VI of the Republic, where the Good is portrayed as the sun which illuminates all of reality through the forms. In this same way, Light illuminates our minds and removes the fog of ignorance. That is, the Light, or the Sun in Rep. illuminates our mind by giving rise to the forms which allow us to even speak of reality and see it at all. Without the Light creating the forms, there would be only confusion and nihilism. In this same way, the Light, by allowing access to the forms, eliminates nihilism. 

I am not sure what the discussion of love means - why the Light gives more and more of itself because the beings loved much. Perhaps this means that as the beings participate in this Light and Good, the Good reveals more and more of itself. 

Section Six

He states that the Good, “which is above all light” is given the names of the light of the mind, overflowing radiance, and so forth. 

The Neoplatonic triad of remaining, proceeding, and reverting is doing the heavy lifting in this section. 

The Good, or the Light is a unifying principle as well. It unifies knowledge.

 Divine Names Ch.3 [in progress outline]

Intro: Place within the work as a whole

• Previous section: Unified and differentiated Names. Apply to the whole Godhead

• Question of Trinitarian distinctions in regard to unitary and differentiated names. 

Announced at end of Ch.2: “...such kindly processions of the entire Godhead, I shall seek to praise as well as I can, using the divine names which reveal them in Scripture.”

-Relation of Names to Processions? Cf. DN 2.10; Ch.1 589D

Structure of Ch.3

Purpose: The first Name and “most important”: “Good”

• “Shows forth all the processions of God”

1. Invocation of the Trinity prior to discussion of the Good.

-”The source and superior to what is good.”

To learn of all the good gifts, the processions, we have to be uplifted and shaped by it (680B).

-Shaping: occurs in the next sections. Regarding Angels, they are shaped by the Good by desiring it (696A).

Uplifted by Prayer: 

• Two metaphors: Shining chain and Boat and rock.

-principle: God is not “anywhere”

-our prayers purify us and so seem to make God “come down”

- orthodoxy of this view of prayer? Iamblichus, Origen, etc.

II. Dionysius’ apologia for giving an account of the Divine Names; Relation to Hierotheus 

• Moving from Trinity and prayer, to Hierotheus as teacher and guide and elder.

• Assumption: Do not repeat, do not add to something that has already been expressed by someone in a more authoritative position in divine things.

• Hierotheus is an unimpeachable authority. He wrote an Elements of Theology.

• His writings are “Second only to the divinely anointed scriptures themselves”

So why is Dionysius writing “as though what he [Hierotheus] wrote were not quite sufficient”?

• Hierotheus did not cover “every area of theology”

• An “Injustice” to a teacher and friend if he had covered everything...

• To each his own; If Dionysius claimed as “his own” the contemplation and revelation of “someone who, next to the divine Paul, has been my elementary instructor” then it would be an injustice.

• But: “Like an elder” Hierotheus gave only a “condensed summary”

• Dionysius thus can be authorized to “explicate and to separate...in an argument proportionate to my own powers”

• Timothy also encourages Dionysius to write, claiming Hierotheus’ book, elements of theology, is “too lofty for him”

• Dionysius thus writes “for those of his own kind” (Again, pursuing Justice)

• “A direct look at the conceptual scriptures...is only for those of an elder’s powers”

• “Whereas...to learn the thinking preliminary to all this is for lesser, yet sacred, initiators.

• Dionysius quotes Hierotheus and levels of initiation: DN 2.9-10

• Levels of initiation: 

• Learning directly from sacred writers [cf. 592B]

• Research of the Scriptures

• More mysterious inspiration...not only learning, but also experiencing divine things.

    

  III. “Dormition” passage [Event interpreted since John of Scythopolis as a dormition scene (Tuomo Linkila, Proclus and his legacy, p.176)]

• A “Vision” [ten thean; a spectacle an observing]

• “Of that mortal body” “source of life, which bore God”

• Greek: [tou zoarchikou kai theodochou somatos]

• James brother of Christ and Peter are listed. Peter is called the “summit, chief of all those who speak of God”

After the Vision: A hymn of praise; Structure of experience and then hymns

1. Mysterious inspiration, the event

2. Speaking and writing, communication, putting the event in words, a hymn

3. Learning from the speaking and writing, teaching others, expanding on etc.

The Hymns of praise:

• Each of the hierarchs “chose” [edokei; it seemed best]

• “Each as they were able” (analogy, justice)

• “To praise the “omnipotent goodness of that divine frailty” [ten apeirodunamon agathoteta tes thearchichēs astheneias] lit: infinitely powerful goodness of the source of God weakness?

• Meaning of this phrase? Jesus, Mary?

The Hierarchy of mystical union and expression amongst those present

- "Next to the sacred writers themselves” [meta tous theologous] [Hierotheus is below the apostles?]

“Surpassed [ekratei] all the divinely rapt hierarchs” [those ordinary bishops present? or also apostles?]

• being completely outside of himself [holos ekdemon; literally from home, abroad; outside the people, gathering] 

• Grants Dionysius a special legitimacy as being there and having Hierotheus as teacher??

How did he surpass the others?

“So taken out of himself...” [existamenos heautou] 

“experiencing communion with the things praised” [tēn pros ta humnoumena koinonian paschōn]

• Reference to “Communion” as liturgical? [cf. St. John of Kronstadt rapt at liturgy]

   

• Dionysius appeals to collective experience [Which Timothy shared as being there]:

• “Everyone who saw...heard...knew...did not know...considered him to be inspired, to be speaking with divine praises" [theoleptos...theios hymnologos krinomenos]

• Implications for those who were NOT there? Those who need to be brought in

DN 3.3 Structure of experience and then communicating to multitude

• Cf. Parables of Christ. (In private Christ revealed all things to his disciples)

• “Say nothing of those mysterious experiences” [Remaining?]

• “Necessary to communicate with the multitude” [Proceeding?]

• “In order to bring as many as possible into our sacred knowledge” [Return?]

• Vs. elitist freemasonry, esotericism;

• "Divine philosophy" as love, seeking to know the truth and bringing as many as possible into union

• Hierotheus excels in the practical life to the extent that he also excels in contemplative vision?

• “He spent more time than most sacred teachers on this labor...[teaching others and bringing them in]”

Dionysius cannot look at even the writings of Hierotheus? Must produce at a lower level

• Such was the purity of his mind...accuracy...other sacred words....could not look...at this great sun [See sun analogy and light in DN ch.4]

• Again the appeal to Justice and inadequacy of being on the same level of knowledge of God.

• Why, again, does Dionysius speak of theology if he cannot bear to look at Hierotheus?

• One may not disregard the received knowledge of divine things. 

  • Hierotheus communicated his knowledge to some degree to Dionysius.

   

• Why not disregard? 1.: spirit naturally yearns for and seeks contemplation of supernatural [hyperphuos] attainable. [lit: desires of minds always erotically striving of a vision granted of supernatural things]

• 2.: divine laws command it: we should both learn everything granted to us and SHARE these treasures generously with others.

• Thus writing Divine Names is a form of Obedience.

• Dionysius is seeking truth and helping others with equal “contemplative capacities”, that is, who also cannot understand Hierotheus (cf. Timothy)

• Divine Names contains no “new ideas”...rather an expansion of Hierotheus. [cf. questions of tradition and development of doctrine]

Question: What is the relation between “divine philosophy” and “contemplation” [theoria] of divine truths in writing and the mystical experiences of Hierotheus?

• Perhaps the exercise of prayer, invocation of the Trinity, and learning can progressively aid in purifying so that experience of divine things is made possible by climbing the ladder in words laid down by those who have experienced the things without needing words etc.

Image

Title: Iconostasis (egg tempera; panel 12 1/4" x 1 7/8"). Date: early XV. Material: Painting (detail). 

Description

Transfiguration; above, bearded Christ with cross-nimbus, body surrounded by inverted dark five-pointed star within circular green with darker green border, wearing white garments, standing on mountain top, flanked by nimbed bearded Elijah and Moses who holds open scroll, each standing on adjacent mountain top, both turned toward Christ, inclining bodies; below, three disciples struck with awe: John lying on back, right hand covering face; James fallen forward, right hand on top of head; white-haired bearded Peter kneeling, turning head toward Christ; all against radiant golden background. Dacenko (in Alpatov) notes that the disciples have fallen to the ground in fear inspired by the miracle of the transfiguration. Alpatov points out that the profiles of the bowing prophets coincide with the glory surrounding Christ and that the three figures form a rosette. The icon is flooded with light and seems to radiate it.Some details are used repeatedly in representing the transfiguration scene, for example the three mountain tops with Christ standing on the one at center, Elijah on the one at left and Moses on the one at right. Christ wears shining white garments. Behind him is an aureole which is darker at the center. [In this case the aureole has a dark border and a darker five-pointed star occupies the center behind Christ.] The apostles fall to the ground at Christ's transfigured splendor. Peter is the only one who raises his head to look toward Christ. The figure of John, fallen on his back and covering his face, is a feature not to be found in icon painting before the 15th century. It stems from an ascetic movement which flourished at Mt. Athos at the end of the 14th and beginning of the 15th century in which monks achieved a visionary state by means of a physiopsychic technique. They believed this permitted them to see the light energies of God in the Transfiguration of Christ and that they were transfigured themselves. In this state the monk was thought to be not only transfigured but wrapped in a garment of glory, depicted on some icons as a transparent garment. These theories were based on the earlier 'writings of Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite (6th century) who taught that man cannot see the light-glory of God. This is beyond the sight of man and therefore appears as complete darkness to him, what Dionysius calls "overlight darkness." The reproduction of the profound emotions involved were not indigenous to the contemporary Russian spiritual conception. The inspiration came from outside, probably by way of the Balkans, perhaps with the appointment of a metropolitan at Kiev who used certain psychological techniques of speaking and writing to set the mind into pious excitement and who found many followers in western Russia. [--Onash.]

Transfiguration of Christ, flanked by Elijah and Moses.

Attributed to Rublev (ca. 1360/70-1430), Russian painter. The iconostasis was commissioned in 1405 and among the painters the names of Theophanes the Greeks, Rublev and Prokhoros of Gorodetz are mentioned in contemporary records. [--Dacenko, in Alpatov.]