Ch. 5 of Perl's Theophany: on the Hierarchy of Being (65-71)

 1. God is not the hierarch of the whole of reality

Perl begins by identifying one aspect of Dionysius’ metaphysics, viz. his conception of “the whole of reality as a hierarchically ranked sequence” (65). At the highest rank stands “angels, or pure intellects”; at the lowest, inanimate beings. Notably, God is not identified as standing at the highest rank; he is not identified as the hierarch of reality.

This is because God cannot be considered “a member of the totality of beings” (11). That is, if the whole of reality consists of all the members of reality, and to be the hierarch of the whole of reality requires being a member of reality, then God is not the hierarch of reality, for God is not a member of reality. 

My reconstruction of Perl’s argument for why God cannot be a member of the totality is as follows (Cf., 11). First, we make six assumptions that lead from an understanding of being to a notion of dependency (viz., any being is a member of a set, and every member of a set is necessarily a dependent entity): 

1. If X is a being, then X is a member of the set of beings
1. [ENTITY ⊃ MEMBERSHIP]
2. X is a member of a set only if X is not the other members 
1. [MEMBERSHIP ⊃ NEGATION]
3. X is not Y only if X is differentiated from Y 
1. [NEGATION ⊃ DIFFERENTIATION]
4. X is differentiated from Y only if X has a determination F that distinguishes it from Y 
1. [DIFFERENTIATION ⊃ DETERMINATION]
5. If X has a determination F, then X isn’t itself without F 
1. [DETERMINATION ⊃ MEDIATED SELF-RELATION]
6. If X isn’t itself without F, then X depends on F 
1. [MEDIATED SELF-RELATION ⊃ DEPENDENCY 

Finally we make an assumption regarding the nature of God:

1. X is God only if X is not in any respect dependent on something other than himself
1. [GOD ⊃ INDEPENDENT]

With these assumptions in place, we then attempt a reductio. Let's assume that God is a member of the totality. Through repeated application of universal instantiation and modus ponens, we get the claim that God is dependent on that determination F that distinguishes him from other members of the totality. 

In short, the problem with conceiving of God as a being, is that it entails conceiving God as distinct from other beings. But once God is conceived as distinct from others, imputing a determination to God is unavoidable. Yet imputing to God a determination portrays God as dependent. For he now has a nature, i.e., he is who/what he is in virtue of a determination. His being is mediated, i.e., he has a nature that allows him to be. Once he is mediated, i.e., once he has a nature, he is demoted below the determination that constitutes his nature. Every nature includes a defining determination, e.g., the human includes rational thought as its defining determination. Each human is therefore dependent on rational thought. God must not have a nature, since if he did, he would be dependent on the determination that constitutes his specific nature. And thus he wouldn't be God. 

2. “Dionysius’ understanding of hierarchy […] is a development of his account of the divine processions” (65)

According to Perl, Dionysius’s understanding of hierarchy is a development of his account of the divine processions. Further, Perl claims that the divine processions are identical to “the constitutive perfections of beings” (65). Even further, he claims that the divine processions are identical to “the whole of reality” (65). From this, he infers that “the whole of reality” is “the differentiated presence of God” (65). Thus, according to Perl, for Dionysius reality or being is theophany: “the whole of reality, all that is, is theophany, the manifestation or appearance of God (32-33; cf. 3). We might say that Dionysius subscribes to “theophanism” (a term used by Henry Corbin, History Of Islamic Philosophy, 200).

How does the argument for theophanism work? First we begin with the nature of the divine processions. As Dionysius describes them, the processions are “nothing other than the powers brought forth from it  [he hiddenness beyond being [viz.] God] to us” (645A, cited by Perl, 29). From this quote alone, we do not yet know how Dionysius envisions the relationship between these powers brought forth from God into us and “the constitutive perfections of beings,” i.e., between these powers from God and the determinations that qualify beings. Potentially, only some of the characters that characterize beings are powers brought forth from God into us. However, it is important to note at the outset that the divine processions are powers brought into us. Presumably, it implies that any divine procession is a power integrated into our nature, thus a determination, i.e., something in which we participate, rather than an independent force exerted by God upon the cosmos from the outside; we are close to Gregory of Nyssa’s notion that “the divine power permeates everything” (quoted by Ramelli, 190). 

According to Dionysius, these powers are not only “deifying,” but they are “being-making” and “life-producing” and “wisdom-giving” (29). In other words, these powers endow each being with its being; each living thing with its life; and each cognitive thing with its cognition, or wisdom. In a Platonic context, what endows something with being, life, or wisdom, are the forms Being, Life, and Wisdom, respectively. For Being, Life, and Wisdom are that “by which” “their instances are such as they are,” and hence Plato considers the form to be the “the cause […] that makes its instances such” (Thinking Being, 19). A living thing is living only in virtue of Life itself, and so forth. In short, when Dionysius says that the divine processions or powers are “being-making” and “life-producing” and “wisdom-giving” (645A), he is implying that they are Being, Life, and Wisdom. Thus, we get some sense for the equivalence between the divine processions and “the constitutive perfections of beings,” insofar as the Forms are “the very intelligible contents, the truth and reality of sensible things,” hence it is plausible to take them as the constitutive perfections of beings: 

So, at this point, we have one definition and three identities: 

• Def. of divine procession: a power brought forth into us from God, i.e. the hiddenness beyond being
• (ID 1) Divine processions = the Forms
• (ID 2) the Forms = constitutive perfections of beings
• (ID 3) Divine processions = constitutive perfections of beings

As mentioned, Perl considers the divine processions are identical to “the whole of reality” (65). How so? 

    The first step is “the foundational principle of Neoplatonic thought” that “to be is to be intelligible” (5). According to this principle, there is no gap between being and the intelligible, i.e. “that which can be apprehended by […] intellection” (ibid.). However, what is apprehensible are the Forms: “The forms are ‘what is most true of things’ (Phd. 65e1–2) just as their ‘looks,’ that in them which is given to awareness, the intelligible identities in terms of which things can be identified by thought” (TB, 25). If what is apprehensible are the Forms, and being is the intelligible, then the Forms are being. 

The Form is the light through which a being is apprehended: a being is apprehended in light of its Form. I can grasp this living being in virtue of the Form Life. If to be is to be intelligible, then the reality of this being is its being an appearance of the Form. Through Life, or through the intelligible look of Life, this being is intelligible, yet the reality of this entity is its intelligibility; but its Form is its intelligibility. Hence what this being is, or its reality, is its being an appearance of Life: what is intelligible about it is Life, and so what is real about this being is its being an appearance of Life. In short, we have the identity of reality and the Forms, and so

• (ID 4) Divine processions = the whole of reality

From this Perl makes the following inference: since the divine processions = the whole of reality, then the whole of reality is “the differentiated presence of God” (65). First, a few points of clarification. 

1. Reality is the differentiated presence of God, because being is an “internally differentiated multiplicity of forms” (7). Thus, Perl is affirming the differentiated character of being. He is not negating the differentiations as illusions for the sake of cosmic non-differeniation (cf., “Acosmism” which “in the Hegel/Spinoza literature […] refers to the view that finite things have no reality” (Feeney, 153)). 
2. Though reality is the presence of God, God is “all things in all things and nothing in any” (DN, 872A). In other words, if reality is the presence of God, that does not imply (for Perl) that he is “any one thing” (31)
3. Reality is the presence of God, insofar as God “is all things” while not being any one of them, because “he is all things without distinction” (31)
4. Reality is the presence of God, but this doesn’t mean he is “‘in all things,’ as if he were in something other than himself” (30). Instead, the whole of reality is God: “God is the whole content of reality” (30). Quoting Dionysius, God “is all things as cause of all things, and holding together and pre-possessing in himself all principles, all limits of all beings” (30, DN V.8, 824A–B). In short, rather than being in all things, God “is all beings and none of beings” (DN 596C, 31). He is “none of beings” because he is “all things without distinction,” i.e., God is not all the beings insofar as beings are “[differentiated] form one another” (31). 

To give some sense of this doctrine, first recall the Platonic notion that an entity is an image or appearance of the form(s) in light of which it is intelligible. So, if we conceive of appearance as presence, then in the Platonic conception, reality is the presence of the Forms. But now suppose that each Form is part of the whole of God. In that case, one might want to say that reality is the presence, in the sense of manifestation, of God. In this reconstruction, we are using the conceptual duality of part-whole for the sake of grasping this notion of reality as the differentiated presence or manifestation of God. But ultimately this reconstruction cannot work, since God cannot have parts. 

3. “The divine processions […] are ordered on the basis of the degrees of universality in which they are participated or present in beings” (65)

The divine processions (i.e., the constitutive determinations of beings) are ranked as Good, Being, Life, Wisdom. Good takes first place because it is participated in with the greatest universality or extension (Perl notes that Dionysius is thereby following Proclus, prop. 101) Indeed, unlike Being, the Good extends from beings to non-beings, rather than just beings. Though it is initially unclear what Dionysius means by saying that the Good is the constitutive determination of non-beings, according to Perl, “an examination of the comparable passages in Proclus shows that what Dionysius means by the ‘non-beings’ which participate in the Good is in fact simply matter, considered by itself in abstraction from form” (68). This would contrast with Cusa’s interpretation, who reserved a notion of “intelligible nothing, or chaos […] [which] Infinite Power (which is Not-other) can constrain to be ordered” (De Li Non Aliud, 1120). 

The question regarding this claim is why exactly should the Good be highest and Wisdom lowest, if the cognitive being is more precious than sensible being (much less matter abstracted form). This is an objection addressed by Dionysius and quoted by Perl: “Wherefore is Being set above Life and Life above Wisdom, when living things are above beings, and sensitive things which live above these, and rational things above these, and the intellects are above the rational things and are more around God and closer to him?” (DN V.3, 817A ) (69). 

The answer to the objection is that “the more universal [processions] contain the less universal as their specifications” (70). In other words, it would seem Life should be higher than Being because living things are superior to inanimate beings. In response, Perl and Dionysius say that Being should be higher than Life, because Being contains Life as a specification: “Being is above Life […] because Life is nothing but a specification of Being” (70). How does this solve the problem? Being must remain above Life because Life in fact is Being in a specific mode. Specifically, it is Being in a more “intense mode” (70). Yet if Life is a more intense mode of Being, then why say that Life is a specification of Being, instead of saying Being is a detraction or lessening of Life?

Perl points out that in Plato, “the less universal forms are identified as differentiated specifications of the more universal, and the more universal forms are understood as unities overarching and pervading a multiplicity of less universal ones” (7). Would it be correct to say that for Plato, when X is a specification of a more universal Y, then X is derivative of Y. Hence all the forms are derivative of the Good, for example? (cf., 35) Further, Being must be above Life because Life is a derivative of Being, insofar as it is a specification and mode of Being? 

If “all reality” “is the presence of the One, in differing modes and degrees” such that “life is a higher degree of unity than mere existence, and consciousness a higher degree of unity than life,” then Life is higher than Being in terms of unity (67). Life and Being are both the One; the only difference is that Life is a more intense form of the One. If Life is the One but in a more intense mode than Being, then why is Life a specification of Being?

Perl also says that “Life, in plants […] is not superadded to Being, but is the more specific, intense mode of Being proper to them as compared to stones” (70). Perl is saying that the appearance of a plant is the appearance of Life, which is an appearance of Being, because Life is a mode of Being. Further, Life is not only a mode of Being, but it is a more intense mode of being than what stones have. Yet what do stones have? Being. Stones are an appearance of Being. But does this not imply that Life is a more intense mode of Being than Being itself? 

The highest rank of beings are angels or intellects, and they “possess in a higher way all the perfections of lesser beings” (70). If Life is a specification of Being, and Wisdom a specification of Life, then living is being-livingly, and cognizing is livingly-being in a cognizing manner. To be and live in the form of cognition is to-be “in the fullest, most complete, and therefore paradigmatic sense” (70). Intellect and Being are therefore the same — the only difference is that Intellect is Being at its “most perfect level” (70). Yet is Being, then, what rocks have, or is Being what cognitive beings have? Since the cognitive being is the most full expression of Being, why say that the rock has being, if actually the cognitive is the fullest expression of Being? Would we call plants “plants” if it were the case that cognitive beings were the most perfect kind of plant? Are there two senses of Being, whereby rocks exist, yet intellects exist more perfectly than rocks? 

To review here are a few of the ways that Perl describes the relationship between Life and Being. Looking at this list, while [1] suggests the superiority of Being to Life, neither [2] nor [3] does.

• [1] LESS universal to MORE universal
• life = specification of MORE universal Being
• [2] MORE intense to LESS intense
• Life = more intense mode of Being than Being
• [3] HIGHER DEGREE of unity to LOWER degree of unity
• Life = higher degree of unity than mere existence

4. “Dionysius’ hierarchy of causal determinations is […] fundamentally the same as that of Proclus. Proclus, however, ‘hypostasizes’ all these terms” (66)

Proclus apparently hypostasizes the Good, Being, Life, and Wisdom. To hypostasize these, is to treat them not simply as principles (which the word seem to mean more literally), but also as substances, entities, or realities; this opens the possibility of identifying them as gods (67). In contrast, Dionysius says that “the various divine processions are not ‘demiurgic substances or hypostases,’ a multiplicity of divinities or quasi-divine entities in between God and his products” (67). So we have two different interpretations of Good, Being, Life, and Wisdom:

1. as productive substances or entities; divine for Proclus; intermediate between the ultimate (the One) and reality

vs. 

1. as “good processions and divine names” (816C-817A); no multiplicity of divinities; Perl: “nothing but the differentiated presence of God in different beings” (67)

5. “But is the difference really so great? As we have seen, Proclus’ elaborate reifications are best understood as ‘aspects’”

According to Perl Good, Being, Life, and Wisdom for Proclus are “various levels of manifestation of the One” or aspects of the One (67). In calling them “aspects,” Perl notes that he is following Dillon in his introduction to Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides: “The extreme realism of Proclus’ philosophical position leads to his postulation of distinct entities answering to each aspect of an hypostasis, but things become clearer if we think of them as just aspects after all” (xx). In another context, Perl says describes the idea that Proclus “hypostasized” intelligible determinations or “universals” as a “delusion”: “To understand Proclus’ position, we must begin by observing that Platonic ideas and Procline monads are not, and never were, reified or hypostatized universals. (Will that delusion ever be put to rest?)” (149). 

A few points. First, the One is present constitutively, i.e., as constituting the being in itself. Second, the One is present in this way for “all things,” i.e., the One’s constitutive presence extends to all beings whatsoever. Third, while it is present constitutively in all things, it is constitutively present in a “differentiated” way, i.e., it is possible for the One to be present in two beings according to a different “mode of unity.” Fourth, the manner in which the One is present (as the being’s constitution) is different depending on the “levels of specificity” (67); the One is present according to the “mode of unity proper to [the beings]” (ibid.). “The Good […] is present in all things analogously, or in the manner proper to each” (70). So the claims are that 

1. When the One is “present,” we mean to say that it is constitutively present in the being [SENSE OF PRESENCE]
2. The One is constitutively present to all beings [SCOPE OF PRESENCE]
3. The One is constitutively present to all beings in a differentiated way [DIFFERENTIATION OF PRESENCE]
4. The differentiation of the constitutive presence of the One hinges on what is “proper to each” being [PROPORTIONALITY OF PRESENCE]

It is not clear what (4) could mean, since the constitutive activity of the One is generative of the being, hence the specificity of the being doesn’t precede the One’s constitutive presence. The Good doesn’t first spy the being and then decide to get involved in the manner proper to it; its involvement constitutes the being in the first place. So what does it mean? If the “illuminations” discussed by Dionysius are the constitutive “determinations of creatures,” then the shining forth of God into creartes are the constitutive determinations of creatures (70). But these rays or illuminations illuminate or constitute beings not in an identical way [DIFFERENTIATION], but in ways “analogous” to each of the beings, which is to say, that the kind of illumination or kind of constitutive determinations (assuming there are multiple kinds), hinges on what would be “appropriate to and constitutive of that being” (71). Yet the being does not have any prior form of being before receiving its constitutive determination: the constitutive determination is its form of being.

The difference between a living being and a merely existing being, is that the living being participates in Life, yet Life constitutes “a higher degree of unity than mere existence” (67). The difference among the various intelligible forms, are really differences of degrees of oneness. (Does this imply a quantitative distinction among the ranks of Form or intelligible determinations?)

The different intelligible determinations are not distinct substances, but are different “aspects” of the One (67). They are different “aspects” of the One in the sense that the One manifests in different ways, and these differing ways of manifestation are the different “terms such as Being, Life, and Intellect” (67). The sameness between these different ways of manifestation is that each of them is a “mode of unity” (130). What makes them different modes of unity? They are different in that their “degree of unity” is diminished (71). Hence Intellect is identical to Being except insofar as the degree of unity is less diminished. Yet what explains more or less diminished degrees of unity? Can it be the doctrine of proportionality, that “God, the Good, is present in each thing, as Dionysius says, ‘according to its rank’” (71).

For Perl, Life is one mode in which unity can be “effectively present to” a being. The manner in which unity is present to a being can alter. For one being, unity is present as Life. For another being, unity is present as Wisdom. For each and every intelligible determination, that determination is just another mode in which unity is present. What accounts for this diversity of modes of presence of unity? If it is a quantitative distinction, what reason is there for a lessening or heightening of unity’s intensity? Does the doctrine of proportional presence or fitting presence explain this (71)?

6. “Only the One or Good, as the total and absolute source of all reality whatsoever, is God in an absolute sense, and lesser terms are ‘gods’ only because and insofar as they are distinct modes of unity” 

According to Perl, in virtue of this aforementioned position, Proclus should be more objectionable to “a thoroughgoing polytheist than to a Christian” (68). A few points:

• to be God in the absolute sense, requires being the total source of all reality
• In Proclus, if anything is called God besides the One or Good, then that is because it is a mode of unity. Hence Proclus only deifies either the One or modalities of the One.

What is the difference between a mode of unity and the One absolutely? The gods are the “proper manifold” “of participated terms” of God qua the One (67). Does this mean only the henads are gods? (Henads are “the many different unities in which beings participate” and are the “differentiated presences of the One in all beings” (23, 45).) Or is it the case that all intelligible determinations are gods, since each and every intelligible determination (Life, Beauty, Wisdom, etc.) are “modalities of unity” (67)? 

He also suggests the difference between a mode of unity and the One absolutely, is that the One is One unqualified, whereas the mode of unity is “a particular goodness and a particular henad” (67). What does it mean to be a qualified oneness? Does that mean to be oneness insofar as it is contracted to this or that being? Is the unity that allows me to be ONE being — is this unity a henad? 

7. Proclus “[subsumes] lower divinities into higher [divinities] and ultimately into the One”

8. “Even non-beings participate in God as the Good”

As Perl explains, the non-beings = matter. The reason matter is a non-being, because in-itself it is nothing, i.e. it has no intelligibility. Once we say anything of it, we are speaking of a form, and thus we are speaking of the matter insofar as it manifests something other than itself, viz. form. Thus, matter is not anything by itself, it is only something through another, viz. form. 

Though matter is non-being, it is has the positivity of being what can receive forms. So what this implies, as Perl explains, is that insofar as matter refers to the receptivity of beings, or their possibility to be through possession of a form, this very receptivity is given to them through the Good. Thus, the potential to be, or the potential to take on form, “is itself a gift” (69). 

Perl also suggests that the receptivity of beings, or their neediness with respect to forms, or their poverty in being and their need to possess form in order to be, can be understood as their “love”: “The material aspect of beings, as their neediness or receptivity, could be regarded as their love” (69). A being is “constituted as a being” only by receiving a form or God in one differentiated mode; hence the material aspect is loving, actively receptive of God. And only through this love, can a being come to be. Yet since this neediness and love “is itself a gift” and itself a manifestation of the Good, this “love itself, as God in them, is given to them.” 

The situation is obviously paradoxical: how exactly is the material aspect of beings, and or the neediness of form, in fact a differentiated presence of God qua the Good? Does that not imply that the material aspect of being is an appearance of the Good, and hence not material or non-being, i.e., not potential to receive form or neediness of form, since it is actually the appearance of form, viz. the Good? 

9. “Dionysius’ doctrine of analogous participation in God…” (71)

The doctrine of analogous participation says that when it comes to participation, “being is to a stone as life is to a plant” (71). That is, when we predicate of the stone and the plant that they participate in God, this predicate doesn’t apply in a univocal respect. The participation in each case is not identical, but analogous or similar. Specifically, the participation of the stone in God is mediated by Being or its being; in contrast, the participation of the plant in God is mediated by Life or its life. Hence when we say that X participates in God, the sense of the predicate will vary. But according to what principle does the sense of the predicate vary? In other words, why do beings participate in God in one way rather than another? 

The reason that a being participates in God in one way and not another, is because that particular manner is “appropriate to and constitutive of that being” (71). In short, the kind of being that the thing is, determines the manner in which the being participates in God. Thus, the doctrine of analogous participation is the doctrine that:

1. the participation of beings in God is not identical across all beings [NON-IDENTICAL PARTICIPATION]
2. the participation of beings in God is analogous, i.e., all are participants but not each participation is identical; instead there are different modalities of participation [IMPLICATION OF (1)]
3. The specific mode of participation in God that accrues to this or that being is set or determined by the kind of being that the being has

Notably, by (3), in virtue of knowing an entity’s kind of being, we are immediately in a position to know the nature or modality of its participation in God. There is no gap between the kind of being of X and the sort of participation in God of X. Knowing the kind of being reveals its mode of participation. This conception of participation implies that God’s “intervention” or relationship with the world isn’t only miraculous, but integrated into the principles of the cosmos, viz. the natures or intelligible determinations that constitute beings. 

10. “Dionysius’ doctrine of analogous participation in God is thus closely parallel to Plotinus’ teaching that the nature of all things is their share in contemplation or intellectual activity” (71)

First, regarding Plotinus’ teaching on the nature of all things. According to Plotinus, the nature of each thing, even inanimate things, amounts to a mode of sharing in contemplation or intellectual activity. That is, the nature of X is necessarily a kind of thinking. If we say that only humans (and angels) are cognitive, we are simply missing the fact that there are different forms of thinking, as if we said that only the carpenter bee is a bee, at the exclusion of honeybees, etc. Thus, insofar as Life is a kind of nature, i.e., the whatness of certain things is Life, Life is a kind of thinking. 

We can say of each and every being that it is thinking. Yet analogy comes in insofar as the thinking predicated of each and every being has an analogous sense; it is not univocal: thinking for plants is not identical to the thinking of animals. Does this imply a distinction with the bee example? That is to say, when we say that the bumblebee and the carpenter bee are bees, are we predicating univocally, since the beeness of each bee abstracts from the distinction between carpenter and bumblebee? (Plato, 72b). In other words, what is necessary to establish analogous participation in F? Obviously the plant participates in thinking qua living, whereas the rock participates in thinking qua inanimate being (42). But is this difference (between participating qua living vs. participating qua inanimate), the same kind of difference whereby one bee is a bee qua a carpenter bee, whereas another bee is a bee qua bumblebee? 

11. “Dionysius’ doctrine of analogous participation in God is thus closely parallel to Plotinus’ teaching” (71)

So how are they parallel? Each being participates in God, yet this participation takes radically different forms: participating in God qua living vs. qua being, and so forth. Similarly, in Plotinus, each being participates in thinking, yet this participation takes radically different forms: participating in thought qua living vs. qua being, and so forth. 

12. “Dionysius’ doctrine of analogous participation in God is thus closely parallel to Plotinus’ teaching” and “the same principle can be found in Proclus,” viz. that “all things are in all things” (71)

a) On the principle that that “all things are in all things” (71)

So now the idea is that we have three parallels: Dionysius’ doctrine of analogous participation in God; Plotinus’ teaching regarding universal thought; Proclus’ principle that “all things are in all things, but properly in each” (71). What exactly is Proclus’ principle saying? 

First, before explaining the principle, note that, according to Proclus, one can divide beings into at least three classes: simple beings, living beings, and intellectual beings. Further, note that this division seems dependent on negations: the division would be impossible unless the simple beings were not living and not intellectual; and unless the living beings were not intellectual. The principles underling this differentiation are as follows:

1. Simple beings are not living or intellectual, because they LACK both life and intellect
2. Living beings are not simply beings, because they HAVE life
3. Living beings are not intellectual, because they LACK intellect
4. Intellectual beings are not simply beings, because they HAVE intellect
5. Intellectual beings are not simply living, because they HAVE intellect

Notice that the differentiation would break down without the negative moments of (1) and (3). Regarding (1), if simple beings were both living and intellectual, then we would have a different schema: living beings; intellectual beings; both living and intellectual beings. Yet intellectual beings are already both living and intellectual. Hence we would simply have two classes: living and intellectual beings. 

Now, regarding (3), if living beings were intellectual, then we would have a different schema: beings (lacking both life and intellect) and intellectual beings. Hence the elimination of either (1) or (3) results in two classes, not three.

But what happens if we eliminate both? After eliminating (1), we have living and intellectual beings. After eliminating (3), which implies living beings are intellectual, we have one class: the intellectual. 

Now let’s move to Proclus’ principle that “all things are in all things, but properly in each” (71). According to this principle, “In Being there is life and intellect,” hence we seem to eliminate (1) above. Further, “in Life, being and intellect,” hence we seem to eliminate (3) above. What is going on?

On this issue, Dodds uses the idea of predominance to explain the differentation of classes: while “the triad is mirrored within each of its terms,” yet each term will have a predominant character: “the first term has Being as its predominant character” though “it is at the same time Life and Intelligence sub specie entitatis” (254). Thus, the difference between a mere being and an intellectual being is that in the mere being, Being predominates, though Intellect is still present. Hence, it seems the reliance is on a notion of proportion: harkening back to Anaxagoras, every being is made up of identical ingredients, so to speak. That is, each being is constituted by Being, Life, and Intellect. However, in a simple being, Being predominates, and so forth. As far as I know, Dodds doesn’t provide any further explanation of what this means, i.e. if predominance is a quantitative distinction, for example. 

Perl doesn’t seem to use the notion of preponderance. He relies on the notion of specification. He says that “the less universal perfections” such as Intellect are “specifications of the more universal ones.” To be a specification of X, is to be a species or kind of X. Hence, 

1. Life is a kind of being or mode of Being
2. Intellect is a kind of being or mode of Being

However, Perl describes this principle as follows: “living things have intellect ‘vitally,’ i.e. in the mode of life, and intellectual things have life ‘intellectually,’ i.e. in the mode of intellect” (71). This is peculiar because for a living thing to have intellect vitally, is for the more universal (Life) to be a specification of the less universal (Intellect). That is, if living things are vital intellects, then Life is a kind of intellect or a species of Intellect, hence the more universal is a specification of the less universal. 

Another way Perl presents Proclus’ principle is in terms of “degrees of unity” (71). The idea is that Intellect or Wisdom is a higher degree of unity than Life, and Life is a higher degree of unity than Being. Hence Intellect, Life, and Being are determinate or specific degrees of unity. According to Perl, from this idea, we can derive the notion that “all things are in all things” (71). 

It is not clear how this should work. To put it crudely, if Intellect is HIGH degree of unity, and Life is MEDIUM degree of unity, why should it be the case that living things manifests Intellect, if they have yet to reach the HIGH degree of unity? Is it the fact that the living thing is striving toward greater unity all the time, hence its living is ultimately seeking Intellect? Or is the plant really thinking, just in a lower grade. We have at least three options:

1. “plants, in living, are exercising thought in their lower mode” (72) = plants literally have thoughts, but we normally don’t ascribe thoughts to them, because their form of thinking is weaker than ours
2. “plants, in living, are exercising thought in their lower mode” (72) = plants don’t literally have thoughts; yet they are seeking unity; and to achieve a higher grade of unity would amount to finally achieving thought and cognition; hence plants are exercising thought in the sense that all their activity is effectively oriented toward achieving thought, since all their activity is oriented toward achieving unity, and such an achievement would necessarily result in achieving full blown thought.  
3. “plants, in living, are exercising thought in their lower mode” (72) = since exercising thought is a way of being one, and being alive is a way of being one, then being alive is a way of exercising thought. The plant is thinking insofar as it is achieving unity, since thinking is also a way of achieving unity.

In the end, it seems that for Perl we can say the following about each category:

Being

1. Being is Life, but a less intense form of Life
1. Being is Intellect, but a less intense form of Intellect

Life

1. Life is Being, but a more intense mode of Being
1. Life is Intellect, but a less intense form of Intellect
2. Intellect
1. Intellect is Being, though Being in a more intense mode
2. Intellect is Life, though Life in a more intense mode
3. Being, Life, and Intellect
1. Each is the One, though in more or less intense modes

b) On how the principle that that “all things are in all things” is parallel to Dionysius’ doctrine of analogous participation and Plotinus’ teaching (71)

For Dionysius, each being is a participation in God, though according to distinct modes. For Plotinus, each being is thinking, though according to distinct modes. For Proclus, each being includes all the other principles or intelligible determinations, though according to different proportions, following Dodds. Or, according to Perl, each being manifests every intelligible determination, though according to different intensifications. 

13. For Dionysius, “in any hierarchy the same perfection or activity is analogously present throughout all the levels” (71)

Before explaining this principle, first note that, for Dionysius, the levels of the hierarchy are going to be distinguished according to perfections (PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION OF LEVELS). That is, level one is different from level two because level one manifests a distinct perfection than level two. So intellects manifest the perfection of thinking, whereas sensory animals manifest the perfection of “living sensitively” (42). Since these perfections are different, these entities exist on different levels within the ontological hierarchy. 

However, Dionysius maintains that no perfection exclusively inhabits the level that it distinguishes. Even further, no perfection fails to inhabit every level of the ontological hierarchy. Thus, the perfection of “living sensitively” is somehow at work in every level of the hierarchy of reality. How could this be? One potential answer is the following: every perfection is one or another way of participating in God or manifesting God. To manifest a perfection is to manifest God. Therefore, in some sense, all the perfections are interchangeable, since possessing a perfection is just another mode of manifesting God. The sense in which the perfections are not interchangeable, is that “the activity of the lower is that of the higher, in a lesser, analogous way” (72). 

How, then, is living sensitively manifested at every order? Let’s consider the higher orders first: how does a thinking being such as an angel (which is a “pure intellect” (65)), manifest living sensitively? Because living sensitively is a lower grade of unity, whereas thinking is a higher grade of unity, hence the higher grade is a unity that surpasses the lower grade. But in surpassing the lower grade, whatever the lower grade accomplishes is accomplished by the higher grade. Hence, the higher grade includes “living sensitively” in that it accomplishes whatever that accomplishes, though much more. 

Now let’s consider the lower orders: how is living sensitively manifested at lower orders, such as the rock? The rock’s being is seeking to accomplish something, i.e., unity. But the unity that it accomplishes is not perfect. A more perfect accomplishment of unity would come by way of living sensitively. Hence the rock includes living sensitively as an ideal: if it could, the rock would live sensitively, since living sensitively accomplishes the same thing as a rock, just in a more perfect form. In short, we have the following:

1. The higher contains the lower insofar as the higher SURPASSES the lower by doing what the lower does, but better 
2. The lower contains the higher insofar as the lower SEEKS the higher, insofar as the higher does what the lower does, but better