In the Introduction to Theophany, Perl identifies five “characteristic Dionysian themes,” viz., “procession and reversion, evil as privation, hierarchy, mystical union, and symbolism” (1). The focus of Chapter Five is the third, hierarchy (65-81). Perl describes two principal hierarchies in Dionysius: “the hierarchy of beings” (30) and the hierarchy of “divine processions” (65). The first hierarchy is a “cosmic” hierarchy of “creatures” (72, 77), whereas the second hierarchy is “metaphysical” (73). The latter hierarchy is identical with the hierarchy of “causal [or “intelligible”] determinations” (29, 66, 75); it is also identical with the hierarchy of “divine names” (65).
For Dionysius, the divine names identify the different ways in which God “is constitutively present in the various ranks of beings” (65). That is to say, Dionysius conceives of reality as participating in God (69, 72), such that God is “present in” reality (48). (We will discuss the degree of this presence, which turns out to be maximal, in a moment.) But God is present in reality in different ways, i.e., there are different modes by which beings participate in God; and the “divine names” identify the ways in which beings participate in God. Further, these names can be ranked according to “the degrees of universality in which they are participated” by beings (65). In other words, there are certain ways of participating in God which are more universal, or more broadly shared, than others. And thus, we get a hierarchy of divine names, i.e., a hierarchy of ways in which beings can participate in God.
Yet Perl also describes a hierarchy of “intelligible determinations” (equivalently, “constitutive” or “causal” determinations). This hierarchy (which Dionysius considers identical to the hierarchy of divine names, as I discuss below), is a ranked sequence of the principles of existence. That is, the hierarchy of intelligible determinations is an exhaustive and ranked list of the principles by which anything exists whatsoever. Since there are different ways in which beings exist, there are different principles that allow these different ways of existence, hence there are numerous principles of existence.
Now Neoplatonism would say that the list of principles of existence (or principles by means of which an entity might exist [such as Life for living things]), is identical to the list of intelligible determinations (or determinations of entities that are graspable by thought). This identification is due to the Neoplatonic axiom that “to be is to be intelligible” (5). As Perl explains, “every being is intelligible, and hence is, only in virtue of the determination whereby it is what it is” such that “every being depends for its existence on that determination” (10). That is to say, whatever allows a being to be, or grants a thing existence, is necessarily graspable by thought, or is necessarily intelligible (5). But what is graspable by thought is always one determination or another (e.g., that the being is alive, or that the being is cognitive). Hence the entire content of reality, or all that-which allows beings to-be, consists simply of intelligible determinations. To put the same thought in terms of dependency: entities are entirely dependent on intelligible determinations, since nothing other than intelligible determinations constitute beings. In short, the list of all intelligible determinations is the list of all the principles of existence.
So, other than the hierarchy of creatures or beings that populate reality mentioned in the first paragraph above, we seem to have two lists: first, a ranked list of divine names, i.e., the ranked list of ways in which God can be present in things; second, a ranked list of intelligible determinations/principles of existence, i.e., of features that allow things to exist or have being. As mentioned, Perl says that, for Dionysius, these two lists or hierarchies are identical. That is, for any intelligible determination, that determination is simply one way among many ways that God can be present in an entity; and for any divine name, it is simply one among many different features that can constitute a being. In short, whatever a thing’s feature is, such as being alive or being an intellect, we are dealing with God’s presence in the entity. But further, since “the whole content” of reality consists of intelligible determinations (41), the “whole content” of reality is the presence of God: “the whole of reality” is “nothing but the differentiated presence of God” (31); or, “the whole of reality, all that is, is theophany, the manifestation or appearance of God” (32). This is theophanism, which says that reality or being is the manifestation of God. Theophanism is captured in the following description from Balthasar of Dionysius: "Things are not simply the occasion for [Dionysius’] seeing God; rather, [Dionysius] sees God in things. Colours, shapes, essences and properties are for him immediate theophanies” (Quoted in Perl, 135).
The notion that the whole of reality is the manifestation of one God obviously brings up the question of how something that contains differences and distinctions (viz., reality) could be the presentation of one God. In other words, how could something that is not one (reality, in virtue of containing differences and distinctions) be the manifestation of something one (viz., God)?
To appreciate the issue, first we must note that within the Neoplatonic context, reality most immediately is the manifestation of different intelligible determinations (though not necessarily at the exclusion of being a manifestation of God or the One). For example, living things may be said to be “appearances of the unitary [form]” Life; thinking beings are appearances or “images” of the unitary form “Thought, or Intellect”; and so forth (9). Now, if the forms Life and Intellect were identical, then what they ground would be identical, i.e., there’d be no difference between simply living and also cognizing things. Therefore, Life and Intellect are not identical. However, if Life and Intellect are not identical, and reality is (at least) the manifestation of Life and Intellect, then reality seems to be the manifestation of (at least) two principles. But if God is one (and not two), and if reality is the manifestation of at least two principles, then it seems reality cannot be tout court the manifestation of God. If reality manifests a multiplicity of principles, it seems reality is at best a partial manifestation of God, i.e., at best one of the many principles manifested by beings is God.
So, the objection is that reality tout court cannot be the theophany of God, because reality is the appearance of multiple principles, not one principle.
1. First response to the objection
As a first response, one might say that insofar as each of the multiple principles manifest a single principle, and insofar as this single principle is identified with God, then reality will indeed be the manifestation of God, despite the multiplicity of principles or intelligible determinations. The basic thrust of this approach is to grant that there are a multiplicity of principles of existence, and that each entity manifests the specific principles undergirding its existence (for example, the living thing manifests at least Being and Life); but then this approach says that there is a single characteristic manifested through every principle of existence, such that each and every being ultimately manifests this single principle. Identifying this principle (which every principle manifests) as God, each and every being manifests God.
Here is one way of fleshing out this approach. Focusing our attention on the characteristics determinative of entities themselves, we note that that to-be is always also to-be-one, to-live is always a way of being-one, and to-be-an-intellect is also always a way of being one. Insofar as an entity manifests any principle of existence, it also necessarily manifests unity. Participating in any particular principle of existence, or intelligible determination, always includes a manifestation of unity. But if we identify God with the One, then each and every being, insofar as the being manifests Being, Life, or Wisdom, will necessarily manifest God, insofar as each and every being manifests the One.
The position is basically that every intelligible determination shares a particular characteristic, viz., that the determination is necessarily a unifying factor. By manifesting a particular determination, the entity always also manifests unity. Every entity expresses unity in virtue of expressing any intelligible determination.
The problem with this approach as an interpretation of Dionysius, is that it is not a thoroughgoing theophanic account of reality. Generally speaking, there are two kinds of theophanic accounts, one weaker (i.e., partial) and one stronger (i.e., thoroughgoing). The weaker says that each and every entity in some respect is a manifestation of God. The stronger says that each and every entity is in all respects a manifestation of God. The first response given above, I would argue, entails the weaker theophanism.
Insofar as every being manifests oneness, and manifests oneness by means of manifesting any one of the principles of existence, every being manifests God qua the One. But suppose we ask: does each and every being that manifests the One also manifest Life? The answer is of course no. For example, rocks manifest oneness and not Life. There is a difference between manifesting oneness and manifesting Life; and there is a difference because the One and Life are not identical. But now if the One and Life are not identical, then there must be a respect in which Life is the One. If there is a respect in which it is not the One, then appearances of Life will not be identical to appearances of the One.
Admittedly, this is a tricky issue, as I grant that it is inconceivable for an entity to manifest Life and not oneness; the manifestation of Life entails necessarily the manifestation of the One. But there must be a respect in which the manifestation of Life is not a manifestation of the One, otherwise there would be no difference between Life and the One.
In short, if the One is not absolutely identical with Life, there must be some distinction between manifesting the One and manifesting Life. But if this is true, then there is some respect in which every entity manifests something other than the One. Therefore, we have the weaker theophanism described above: while each and every entity would manifest God qua the One in some respect, each and every entity would also not manifest God in another respect, viz., in respect to the particular principle of existence through which the entity manifests the One.
2. Second response to the objection
A second response to the objection (that reality cannot be the theophany of God, because reality is the appearance of multiple principles, not one principle), would begin by saying that God contains every principle of existence. So if the principles of existence are the Good, Being, Life, Wisdom, and so forth, then God contains each of them. One could say that they are contained as divine powers, but the essential point is that they are contained by God. Perl seems to suggest this theory when he says that, for Dionysius, the world is “filled with and constituted by a multiplicity of divine powers at work differently in different things, all of which are presences or manifestations of the One, or God” (68). Perl doesn’t say the world is filled with a multiplicity of divinities, but rather a multiplicity of divine powers. Presumably because each power is not itself a god, instead being a power possessed or contained by God, hence justifying their name as “divine powers.”
The first question for this response is whether God will receive any further determination besides being that which contains each divine power. If we say no, then we are not even consider God as containing them in virtue of being the substance that underlies them, or possesses them as properties. Instead, God is purely the containment of the powers.
In this case, is not clear how an entity would manifest God qua container through manifesting a particular divine power. For when an entity manifests a particular divine power, it manifests that power, and not the one container containing all of them. Approaching God as container of all divine powers is inconsistent with theophanism.
A less crude though similar response might say that God contains all divine powers or intelligible determinations insofar as God is the underlying substance, or perhaps the wellspring from which each of these principles of existence arises. Putting aside the question of justifying the existence of a single wellspring, one wonders how this wellspring could be manifested by an entity. Insofar as the entity manifests a particular principle, and assuming that it is possible to deduce the necessity of a wellspring from any one of the principles, it would be the case that God is knowable in and through the principle manifested by the entity. But the entity would not itself be a manifestation of God, if we take manifestation to imply an immediacy of presentation. That which underlies the intelligible determination is not manifested insofar as only the intelligible determination itself is manifested, just as Nabokov’s mind as such is not manifested by one of his ideas, though one of his ideas represents an occasion to think about Nabokov’s mind, inasmuch as one can reason from an effect to a cause, and hence to Nabokov's mind as the wellspring of his idea.
In regard to the issue of manifestation and immediacy, consider Balthasar’s description of Dionysius’ conception of theophany, cited by Perl: “Things are not simply the occasion for [Dionysius’] seeing God; rather, he sees God in things. Colours, shapes, essences and properties are for him immediate theophanies” (135). According to Dionysius, an essence or intelligible determination is not the occasion to consider God, but is the immediate manifestation of God. But if we construe God as the ultimate foundation or wellspring of all intelligible determinations, and if the entity manifests one or many particular intelligible determinations, then the entity does not directly manifest God. Instead, the entity is an occasion to reason to the cause of any intelligible determination, viz., God qua wellspring.
2. Third response to the objection: intelligible determinations as quantitatively, not qualitatively, distinct
Let’s consider a closer reading of Perl and see if his account can ground a robust theophanism. In Chapter Five, Perl addresses Dionysius’ apparent “repudiation of Proclus’ polytheism” (67). The polytheism consists in “posting a multiplicity of productive divinities subordinate to the One” (ibid.). As Perl makes clear, this is a position regarding the nature of the “constitutive perfections of all things” (ibid.). That is to say, Proclus’ polytheism follows from a specific interpretation of the constitutive perfections or “constitutive determinations by which each [being] is itself and so is” (28). To be clear, the constitutive determinations are the intelligible, formal determinations that grant being to beings, or what I’ve been calling the principles of existence (41). For example, the constitutive perfection of living things is Life, and since it grants being to living things, it is a causal principle of existence; the constitutive perfection of thinking things is Thought, Intellect, or Wisdom; and so forth (66). Proclus’ polytheism apparently takes the following position regarding intelligible determinations: each is a divinity “subordinate to the One” (67). Because the intelligible determination is not the One, an entity’s participation in the determination results in a manifestation of not the One, but the intelligible determination (which Proclus considers to be a divinity).
In virtue of the intelligible determinations being subordinate to the One, and hence not being the One, the production, say, of a living thing is “mediated” (77). That is to say, the production of a living thing is not immediately achieved by means of the One. Instead, the production of a living thing is “mediated” by an intelligible determination subordinate to the One, such as Life. Hence insofar as a being manifests this principle subordinate to the One, it manifests something other than God (or the highest God), implying at least a weak theophanism.
In contrast to this polytheistic view, Dionysius’ position is that, through participation in the intelligible determinations, entities manifest “God himself” (67). Indeed, insofar as intelligible determinations exhaust the entire content of reality, entities for Dionysius are simply “the immediate differentiated presence of God” (ibid.). According to Neoplatonism, what is real and present in an entity are its intelligible determinations, but these determinations constitute the contracted presence of God, according to Dionysius, hence reality is throughout the presentation of God.
To Perl’s interpretation of Dionysius’ position we can again pose the question: how could the entity simply be a presentation of (one) God when the entity is also the presentation of (many) intelligible determinations? Perl’s answer seems to hinge on that the “perfections [or intelligible determinations] of all things are modalities of unity” (67). It appears that the fact that intelligible determinations constitute modes is essential for strong theophanism. Here is the full quote (where Perl also contends that the opposition regarding polytheism between Proclus and Dionysius is merely apparent):
all these subordinate “hypostases” [in Proclus] are contained in and are presences of the One, as the productive power of all things. All perfections of all things are modalities of unity, and hence all reality, for Proclus no less than for Dionysius, is the presence of the One, in differing modes and degrees: life is a higher degree of unity than mere existence, and consciousness a higher degree of unity than life (67)
According to Perl, “for Proclus no less than for Dionysius,” “all reality” is “the presence of the One” or God. In other words, both Proclus and Dionysius subscribe to a strong theophanism. Further, what Perl says here regarding the “perfections of all things” being “modalities of unity” seems to bear directly on our question. Perl is attempting to explain how, despite the subordination of intelligible determinations to the One, and hence despite the apparent difference between the One and the various intelligible determinations, Proclus offers a version of strong theophanism. The key is that the intelligible determinations are ultimately modalities of unity, where one modality is distinguished from another in terms of “degree.”
Perl appears to think that a modal distinction, or a distinction among modes (in this case, a distinction between one mode of unity and another mode of unity), is a distinction of degree. Distinction of degree is, presumably, a quantitative distinction. Thus, the distinction between the various intelligible determinations is apparently quantitative, not qualitative. This would have a surprising result, which is that reality would consist of a single quality, viz., unity. There would be no qualitative distinctions, because any qualitative distinctions among entities would rely on a qualitative distinction between the intelligible forms participated by the entity, yet forms are not qualitatively distinct, only quantitatively. For an example of where this quantitative language appears in Dionysius, Perl cites CH XII.2, 293B: “just as the first [i.e. the higher ranks of angels] possess eminently the holy-befitting properties of the lower, so the later possess those of the earlier, not in the same way, but in a lesser way” (71). The distinction between a lower and a higher rank of beings appears to hinge on intensity of unity.
The appeal of distinguishing intelligible forms quantitatively is that a change in quantity, whereby something becomes larger or smaller, remains indifferent to the character underlying the change. For example, if we have a field and we imagine it expanding or contracting, it remains a field regardless. The character undergoing the quantitative change is indifferent to the change. Similarly, if God is the One, and unity is quantitatively changed to yield different intelligible forms, unity as such can remain the same throughout, qualitatively indistinct though quantitatively distinct.
